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A short proof of Reny (1999)￿ s equilibrium existence theorem for payo⁄ secure
games is provided. At the heart of the proof lies the concept of a multivalued mapping
with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective ￿xed-
point theorem, we show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem which covers
a number of known games. Reny￿ s theorem follows from it straightforwardly.
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21 Introduction
Reny (1999)￿ s theorem states that any game with compact, convex strategy spaces
and payo⁄s at least quasiconcave in each player￿ s strategy has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium if, in addition, the game is better-reply secure. The number of appli-
cations of this important result has been steadily growing. So, it has been applied
to the problem of mixed strategy equilibrium existence in a nonlinear pricing game
by Page and Monteiro (2003) and in a voting game by Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok
(2007). Monteiro and Page (2007) provide su¢ cient conditions for mixed extensions
of discontinuous games to be payo⁄ secure.
The focus of this paper is on payo⁄ secure games. We ￿rst look in detail at
the notion of payo⁄ security. Under the payo⁄ security condition, we associate with
each player￿ s payo⁄ function a multivalued mapping that has the local intersection
property, which was introduced by Wu and Shen (1996). Then we invoke a generalized
version of the Fan-Browder collective ￿xed-point theorem to show an approximate
equilibrium existence theorem (Theorem 2).
Theorem 2 states that every compact, quasiconcave, and payo⁄ secure game has
a pure strategy "￿Nash equilibrium for every " > 0, if, in addition, the players￿
value functions are continuous. These conditions hold in many economic applications,
including ￿rst-price sealed-bid auctions with complete information and Bertrand￿ s
oligopoly games with di⁄erent unit costs. It is worth noting that if, in addition to
these conditions, limit points of each player￿ s approximate best replies, with the level
of approximation converging to zero, are themselves best replies, then the existence
of pure strategy Nash equilbria follows (Carmona 2008).
3In order to obtain Reny￿ s theorem for payo⁄ secure games, we approximate from
below each player￿ s lower semicontinuous value function (which is the case under
payo⁄ security) by an increasing sequence of continuous functions and then invoke
Theorem 2.
The next section contains all necessary de￿nitions.
2 The Model and Some De￿nitions
We consider a game G between n players where each player i0s pure strategy set
Xi is a nonempty compact subset of a Hausdor⁄ topological vector space, and each
player i0s payo⁄ function ui is a bounded function from X = ￿i2NXi to R (X being
endowed with the product topology). Under these conditions, G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is
called a compact game. Denote the set of players by N = f1;:::;ng. A game
G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is quasiconcave if each Xi is convex and ui(￿;x￿i) : Xi 7! R is
quasiconcave for all i 2 N and all x￿i 2 X￿i; where X￿i = ￿k2NnfigXk: The graph
of G is ￿(G) = f(x;u) 2 X ￿ Rn j ui(x) = ui for all i 2 Ng. Let cl￿(G) denote the
closure of ￿(G) in X ￿ Rn and Fr￿(G) = cl￿(G)n￿(G) the frontier of ￿(G); which is
the set of points that are in cl￿(G) but not in ￿(G):
De￿nition 1 Player i can secure a payo⁄ of ￿ 2 R at x 2 X if there exists xi 2 Xi
such that ui(xi;x0
￿i) ￿ ￿ for all x0
￿i in some open neighborhood of x￿i:
The cornerstone of Reny (1999)￿ s existence results is the notion of better-reply
security.
De￿nition 2 A game G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is better-reply secure if whenever (x￿;u￿) 2
cl￿(G) and x￿ is not an equilibrium, some player i can secure a payo⁄ strictly above
u￿
i at x￿:
4Now, we state Reny (1999)￿ s existence theorem.
Theorem 1 (Reny 1999) If G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is compact, quasiconcave, and better-
reply secure, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The notion of payo⁄ security, introduced in Reny (1999), is important for appli-
cations since many games of economic interest are payo⁄ secure.
De￿nition 3 A game G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is payo⁄ secure if for every x 2 X and every
" > 0; each player i can secure a payo⁄ of ui(x) ￿ " at x:
A notion equivalent to payo⁄ security was introduced independently by Tian
(1992).
De￿nition 4 Let Z and Y be subsets of some topological spaces. A function f :
Z ￿ Y 7! R is ￿￿transfer lower semicontinuous in y if for every (z;y) 2 Z ￿ Y;
f(z;y) > ￿ implies that there exists some point z0 2 Z and some neighborhood N(y)
of y such that f(z0;w) > ￿ for all w 2 N(y): A function f : Z ￿ Y 7! R is transfer
lower semicontinuous in y if f is ￿￿transfer lower semicontinuous in y for every
￿ 2 R:
The equivalence of these two notions obtains if, in De￿nition 4, we put f = ui;
Z = Xi; Y = X￿i and ￿ = ui(x) ￿ ":
Example 1 in Carmona (2005) shows that a compact, quasiconcave, and payo⁄
secure game need not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A conventional way
to ensure the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such games is to add a
condition related to but weaker than the upper semicontinuity of the players￿payo⁄
functions. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)￿ s condition that the sum of the players￿
payo⁄functions be upper semicontinuous is often employed. This condition has gone
5through a number of generalizations: reciprocal upper semicontinuity (known also
as complimentary discontinuity) by Simon (1987) and then weak reciprocal upper
semicontinuity by Bagh and Jofre (2006).
De￿nition 5 A game G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous, if
for any (x;￿) 2 Fr￿; there is a player i and b xi 2 Xi such that ui(b xi;x￿i) > ￿i:
Payo⁄ security and weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity together imply better-
reply security. Under payo⁄ security better-reply security is tantamount to weak
reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
We will also need some de￿nitions from multivalued analysis. Let Y and Z denote
subsets of some topological spaces. The domain, DomF, of a multivalued mapping
F : Y ￿ Z is the subset of elements y 2 Y such that F(y) 6= ?.
A mapping F : Y ￿ Z has open lower sections if F ￿1(z) = fy 2 Y : z 2 F(y)g is
open (maybe empty) in Y for every z 2 Z:
The concept of a mulivalued mapping with the local intersection property plays a
central role for payo⁄ secure games.
De￿nition 6 A mapping F : Y ￿ Z has the local intersection property if for each
y 2 DomF; there exists an open neighborhood N(y) of y such that \w2N(y)F(w) 6= ?:
An important observation is that if f : Z￿Y 7! R is transfer lower semicontinuous
in y; then the mapping F￿ : Y ￿ Z de￿ned by
F￿(y) = fz 2 Z : f(z;y) > ￿g;
where ￿ 2 R; has the local intersection property.
Mappings with the local intersection property have found numerous applications
in mathematical economics (see, for example, Mehta and Tarafdar 1987; Baye et al.
61993). Every nonempty-valued mapping with the local intersection property has a
nonempty-valued selection with open lower sections.
Lemma 1 (Ding 1997) If T : Y ￿ Z has the local intersection property and
DomT = Y , then there exists a mapping D : Y ￿ Z with open lower sections
such that DomD = Y and D(y) ￿ T(y) for all y 2 Y .
For the reader￿ s convenience, we provide a short proof of Lemma 1 in the Appen-
dix.
3 Payo⁄ Security and Epsilon Equilibria
In this section we consider conditions which yield pure strategy epsilon equilibria.
Theorem 2 was ￿rst formulated and proved in an unpublished section of Reny (1996)1.
However its proof (Reny 1996, p. 16) repeats most of the proof of Reny￿ s main
equilibrium existence theorem. Our proof, in its turn, is based on invoking the Fan-
Browder ￿xed-point theorem (Theorem 3).
For the sake of completeness, let us remind the de￿nition of a pure strategy
"￿Nash equilibrium. A strategy pro￿le x 2 ￿i2NXi is a pure strategy "-Nash equi-
librium (" > 0) of G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 if ui(x) ￿ ui(yi;x￿i) ￿ " for all yi 2 Xi and all
i 2 N:
It is easy to see that the payo⁄ security of G implies the lower semicontinuity of




1I thank Phil Reny for pointing out this fact to me.
7A stronger property often holds, namely, players￿value functions are continuous in
many games. Examples of such games are ￿rst-price sealed-bid auctions with complete
information and Bertrand oligopoly games with di⁄erent unit costs. These games
might not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but, by Theorem 2, they always
have a pure strategy "￿Nash equilibrium for every " > 0 because, in addition, they
are quasiconcave.
Theorem 2 Let G = (Xi;ui)n
i=1 is a compact, quasiconcave, and payo⁄ secure game.
If, in addition, each player i￿ s value function gi is continuous, then G possesses a
pure strategy "-Nash equilibrium for every " > 0.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on invoking the Fan-Browder theorem, which
Fan (1966) and Browder (1968) used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in every compact, quasiconcave, and continuous game.
Theorem 3 (Fan-Browder) Let X1;:::;Xn (n ￿ 2) be nonempty compact convex
sets, each in a Hausdor⁄ topological vector space. For each i 2 f1;:::;ng; let Mi :
X￿i ￿ Xi be a mapping with nonempty, convex values and open lower sections. Then
there exists x 2 X such that xi 2 Mi(x￿i) for all i 2 N:
In payo⁄secure games, players￿payo⁄functions need not be lower semicontinuous
in the other players￿strategies. So the multivalued mappings associated with players￿
payo⁄functions need not have open lower sections. But it turns out that the mappings
have the local intersection property, so the following generalization of the Fan-Browder
theorem comes in handy.
Corollary 1 Let X1;:::;Xn (n ￿ 2) be nonempty, compact, convex sets, each in a
Hausdor⁄ topological vector space. Let Mi : X￿i ￿ Xi be a mapping with nonempty,
8convex values and having the local intersection property for each i 2 N. Then there
exists x 2 X such that xi 2 Mi(x￿i) for all i 2 N:
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix. Some other formulations and
proofs of Corollary 1 can be found in Wu and Shen (1996, Theorem 2) and Lan and
Wu (2002, Theorem 3.1).
Now, we are in the position to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix " > 0: For each i 2 N; consider the mapping M"
i :
X￿i ￿ Xi de￿ned by
M
"
i (x￿i) = fxi 2 Xi : ui(xi;x￿i) > gi(x￿i) ￿ "g:
It is clear that M"
i is nonempty-valued. Since gi is continuous on X￿i; it is easy to see
that x 7! ui(xi;x￿i)￿gi(x￿i) is transfer lower semicontinuous in x￿i. Therefore, each
M"
i has the local intersection property. The quasiconcavity of ui in xi implies that
M"
i (x￿i) is convex for every x￿i 2 X￿i: Hence, by Corollary 1, there exists x 2 X
such that xi 2 M"
i (x￿i) for all i 2 N:
4 Proof of Reny￿ s Theorem for Payo⁄Secure Games
In this section we prove Theorem 1 for payo⁄secure games under the assumption that
each Xi is a nonempty compact subset of a metric vector space. It is useful to note
that every metric space is a Hausdor⁄ topological space whose topology is generated
by the metric.
Since better reply security is equivalent to weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity
under payo⁄ security, Theorem 1 can be reformulated as follows.
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i=1 is a compact, quasiconcave, payo⁄ secure, and weakly
reciprocal upper semicontinuous game, then G possesses a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
On metric spaces, bounded below, lower semicontinuous functions are pointwise
limits of increasing sequences of continuous functions (see, for example, Aliprantis
and Border 2006, Theorem 3.13). This observation serves as a bridge from Theorem
2 to Theorem 4. The next lemma shows that any increasing sequence of continuous
functions that converges pointwise to a lower semicontinuous function approximates
the function "highly enough" for our purposes (see also Reny 1999, Lemma 3.5).
Lemma 2 Let Z be a metric space and let f : Z 7! R be a bounded below, lower
semicontinuous, and ffkg; fk : Z 7! R; be an increasing sequence of continuous
functions such that limk fk(z) = f(z) for all z 2 Z: Then liminfk fk(zk) ￿ f(z) for
all z 2 Z and all sequences fzkg in Z converging to z:
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix.
Now, we proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. The payo⁄ security of G implies that each player i￿ s value
function gi is lower semicontinuous. Moreover, each gi is bounded since the game G
is compact. Then there exists an increasing sequence of continuous functions fgk
i g;
gk
i : X￿i 7! R; such that limk gk
i (x￿i) = gi(x￿i) for all x￿i 2 Xi.
Let "k be a sequence of positive numbers such that "k # 0: For each i 2 N and
each k 2 f1;2;:::g, consider the mapping Mk
i : X￿i ￿ Xi de￿ned by
M
k
i (x￿i) = fxi 2 Xi : ui(xi;x￿i) > g
k
i (x￿i) ￿ "
kg:
It is clear that each Mk
i has nonempty, convex values. Moreover, since x 7! ui(xi;x￿i)￿
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i (x￿i) is transfer lower semicontinuous in xi, each Mk
i has the local intersection prop-
erty. By Corollary 1, there exists xk 2 X such that xk
i 2 Mk
i (xk
￿i) for all i 2 N: Since
X is compact, we can assume that the sequence fxkg converges to some x 2 X:
We claim that x is a Nash equilibrium of G. Assume, by contradiction, that there
exists i0 2 N such that ui0(x) < gi0(x￿i0): Since liminfk(gk
i0(xk
￿i0) ￿ "k) ￿ gi0(x￿i0)
by Lemma 2, there exists a subsequence fxkg of fxkg along which player i0￿ s payo⁄
jumps down at x. The weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity of G implies that some
player i00 can get a payo⁄ strictly above ￿i00 = liminfk(gk
i00(xk
￿i00) ￿ "k) ￿ gi00(x￿i00) at
x = x, a contradiction.
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Appendix
The appendix contains proofs of some auxiliary results.
Proof of Lemma 1
First note if z 2 \y2BT(y) for some neighborhood B ￿Y , then B ￿ T ￿1(z): De￿ne a
mapping D : Y ￿ Z by D(y) = fz 2 Z : B ￿ T ￿1(z) for some open neighborhood B
of yg: Since T has the local intersection property, D(y) is nonempty for every y 2 Y:
Obviously, D(y) ￿ T(y) for every y 2 Y; and D￿1(z) is open (may be empty) for each
z 2 Z:
11Proof of Corollary 1
Since each Mi has the local intersection property and DomMi = X￿i, by Lemma 1,
there exists Fi : X￿i ￿ Xi with open lower sections such that DomFi = X￿i and
Fi(x￿i) ￿ Mi(x￿i) for every x￿i 2 X￿i and each i 2 N: Then, by Lemma 5.1 of
Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983), the mapping Gi : X￿i ￿ Xi de￿ned by Gi(x￿i) =
coFi(x￿i) also has open lower sections for each i 2 N (coA denotes the convex hull
of A). By Theorem 3, there exists x 2 X such that xi 2 Gi(x￿i) for all i 2 N: Since
each Mi has convex values, Gi(x￿i) ￿ Mi(x￿i) for every x￿i 2 X￿i and each i 2 N:
Therefore, xi 2 Mi(x￿i) for all i 2 N:
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist z0 2 Z and a sequence fzkg in Z
converging to z0 such that limk fk(zk) < f(z0): Since limk fk(z0) = f(z0) and ffkg
is an increasing sequence, there exist integer m and a small enough " > 0 such that
fk(z0) > limk fk(zk)+" for all k ￿ m: The continuity of fm implies that there exists
a neighborhood U of z0 such that fm(z) > limk fk(zk) + " for all z 2 U: Since ffkg
is an increasing sequence, fk(z) > limk fk(zk) + " for all z 2 U and all k ￿ m; a
contradiction.
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